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Zahar Prilepin - Greh

Henri Troyat - Gorki: Sturmvogel der Revolution

Erich Weidinger - Die Apokryphen

http://www.thule-italia.net/religione/Libri/Tedesco/Weidinger,%20Erich%20-%20Die%20Apokryphen%20-%20Verborgene%20Bucher%20der%20Bibel.pdf

Knjigu o Uzicaninu Slobodanu Penezicu Krcunu. Nisam se nikada interesovala za njegov politicki rad posle rata. Sve u svemu, tuzno. Jedino dobro sto je od Uzicke kasabe napravio moderan grad. I sto se izborio za Valjaonicu bakra i aluminijuma u Sevojnu, kraj Uzica. Pored toga, zalagao se za izgradnju pruge Beograd-Bar. Sada sve pocinje da propada. Fabrika, koja je unapredila zivot u celom Uzickom kraju, vise nije nista. Trg takodje, nista se ne obnavlja i renovira, a za prugu, nisam ni sigurna dokle idu vozovi.

Ništa.

I to je nešto. :D

Klaudija.

Avramova ::Klaudija.

Una.

Klaudije je član foruma i jako mi je zanimljivo da ga čitam.

Eastern Christianity and the Communist Threat, 1941–1945

When Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, code name for the invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, Pacelli was confronted with a complex array of hopes and fears. For although his “one, real and principal enemy of Europe” seemed destined for imminent defeat through the summer of that year, there was no saying where this extension of the war might eventually lead. With the likelihood that the Soviet Union might become an ally of Britain, and in time of the United States, the Pontiff found himself faced with the prospect of giving tacit support to Communism in arms. And what if Hitler faltered and failed? Then the Red Army would come westward, heralding a new dark age of persecution and destruction for Christianity. But what if Hitler prevailed and became master of Europe? Was Pacelli entirely convinced that the Nazis were the better of the two totalitarian evils? Certainly some members of the Curia, such as Tisserant, had always believed Nazism the greater menace, and Pacelli is credited with having come around to that view as early as 1942.
“Yes,” he remarked to a Jesuit visitor, “the Communist danger does exist, but at this time the Nazi danger is more serious. They want to destroy the Church and crush it like a toad.”40 There were other alternatives, however, in the complex mix of possibilities, including an opportunity for Catholic evangelization in the wake of the Wehrmacht juggernaut as it headed for Moscow—and the prospect of ending the ancient rift between Roman Catholicism and the Orthodox East. What power of the spirit might not arise from such a new, unified Christendom as the totalitarian giants exhausted themselves in war? To begin with, it looked as though the Wehrmacht was aiding the process of evangelization. As Ukraine was “liberated” in June 1941, German newsreel and print propaganda focused on the restoration of freedom of religion in the East.
Churches used as atheistic museums, warehouses, and club rooms were being restored to their religious purpose and there was evidence of widespread religious renewal in the wake of the Soviet defeat. Franz von Papen, the Catholic ex–vice-chancellor, had been pondering the opportunities for Catholicism in Hitler’s newly conquered territories. He had sent the Führer a memorandum to this effect not long after the invasion. Hitler’s response, by the middle of July, left no room for doubt about the inadmissibility of such a scheme. “The idea of the ‘Old Jockey’ [on] missionary activity was entirely out of the question,” Hitler was quoted as saying. “If one did it at all, one should permit all the Christian denominations to enter Russia in order that they club each other to death with their crucifixes.”41 Hitler had other plans. It was about this time, mid-July 1941, that Hitler declared: “Christianity is the hardest blow that ever hit humanity. Bolshevism is the bastard son of Christianity; both are the monstrous issue of the Jews.”42 Already he was plotting the destruction of the various Churches. “The war will come to an end,” he remarked in December, “and I shall see my last task as clearing up the Church problem.
Only then will the German nation be completely safe. . . . In my youth I had the view: dynamite! Today I see that one cannot break it over one’s knee. It has to be cut off like a gangrenous limb.”43 Hence the propaganda of the religion-friendly German invadersevaporated, and the idea of Catholic proselytism eastward was emphatically rejected by the Führer himself. In November 1941, Hitler issued an order through Martin Bormann that “until further notice nothing should be published about the religious situation in the Soviet Union.”44 Papen would live to deny that his original enthusiasm for the reevangelization of the Soviet Union had been inspired by the Vatican.
Yet a department for missionary work in the East—the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, under Cardinal Eugène Tisserant—did exist in the Vatican. Tisserant hailed from Lorraine in France and was something of an oddity within the Curia for his independence and outspokenness. Carlo Falconi describes him as “a Prince of the Church, but with profane and worldly judgments, for whom politics are almost everything and the world is divided exclusively into allies and enemies. The priest rarely emerges, but when he does his words burn like red-hot steel.”45 It was Tisserant who, writing privately in May 1940 to Cardinal Emmanuel Suhard in Paris, declared: “I fear that history will reproach the Holy See for having practiced a policy of selfish convenience and little else.”46 Tisserant’s activities in the sphere of Eastern evangelization began to figure in Nazi discussions in July 1940.
Alfred Rosenberg, the antiCatholic head of the new Ostministerium, or Ministry of the East, promptly forbade the entry of missionaries into the “liberated” areas of the East. But it was Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Main Security Office, or Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), who turned his attention specifically to thwarting Vatican intentions and scope for action. In a memorandum entitled “New Tactics in Vatican Russia Work,” dated July 2, 1941, Heydrich told the Foreign Ministry that the Vatican had developed a new scheme, which he called the “Tisserant Plan.” With Germany at war with the Soviet Union, he went on, the Holy See had decided to concentrate its entire Vatican-Russia policy in Slovakia and Croatia.
The idea, according to Heydrich, was to recruit supernumerary chaplains, supplemented by Spanish and Italian priests, to accompany units fighting on the eastern front. These undercover clergy would be engaged in intelligence-gathering, looking for opportunities to establish Catholicism in the wake of the German advance. Heydrich concluded: “It is necessary to prevent Catholicism from becoming the real benefi- ciary of the war in the new situation that is developing in the Russian area conquered by German blood.”47
Hitler was sufficiently concerned about the spread of political religious Catholicism in the Reich’s new Lebensraum (living space) to issue two orders, on August 6 and again on October 6, forbidding all Church activity in the interests of the indigenous people. An order on September 4 instructed commanders to report to the high command of the army any “signs of the activating of Vatican Russian work.”48 Heydrich’s information was correct up to a point, but Pacelli’s Eastern policy was more complex than the Nazi understanding of the so-called Tisserant Plan allowed. There had indeed been a long-term scheme for bringing Catholicism to the Soviet Union—not Cardinal Tisserant’s but Pius XI’s, with essential contributions from Pacelli.
The lesson of the early 1920s, following a show trial of Catholic leaders in Moscow in 1923, was the impossibility of striking deals with Bolshevism. Pacelli attempted negotiations with Soviet diplomats when he was nuncio in Berlin, but got nowhere. (As we have seen earlier, he had formed deeply antagonistic attitudes toward Soviet Communism, or Bolshevism, when he witnessed and confronted the “Red Terror” at the Munich nunciature in 1919. His attitudes became more bitter and intransigent in subsequent years as he surveyed Catholic persecution in the “Red Triangle” of Russia, Mexico, and Spain.)
By 1925 most of the bishops of the Latin rite in Soviet Russia had been thrown out, imprisoned, or executed. That year, Pius XI sent a French Jesuit, Michel d’Herbigny, on a secret mission to Russia to ordain as bishop half a dozen clandestine priests. On his way to Moscow, Herbigny stayed in Berlin with Pacelli, who advised him and secretly ordained him bishop. Herbigny’s mission was successful insofar as he managed to ordain his six secret Russian bishops, but they were all discovered and eliminated. In 1929, the year Pacelli was appointed Cardinal Secretary of State, Pius XI founded a Vatican “Commission for Russia.” Later that year he opened on Vatican territory the “Pontifical Russian College,” better known as the Russicum, and the “Pontifical Ruthenian College” where students were to be trained for service in the Soviet Union. Other institutions were also secretly enlisted to educate men for the Russian mission, including the abbey of Grotta Ferrata outside Rome, the abbey of Chevetogne in Belgium, and the abbey of Velehrad in Moravia.
Some of the most powerful orders in the Church—the Redemptorists, the Assumptionists, the Jesuits, and clergy of many backgrounds in Poland—developed their own programs within the scheme of a clandestine evangelization in Russia. Typical of the zeal of ordinary parish clergy who volunteered from even farther afield for the Russian mission was the example of John Carmel Heenan, a parish priest in a district of East London, later to become cardinal archbishop of Westminster.
Heenan got leave of absence from his local bishop and, unknown to that bishop (although with the blessing of the primate of Westminster, Cardinal Hinsley), set out for Russia in 1932 disguised as a commercial traveler, carrying in his baggage a collapsible crucifix inside a bogus fountain pen. In the midst of many adventures, he fell in love with his interpreter and was eventually arrested; at length he managed to talk himself out of trouble and hurried back to the safety of his parish in England.49 After Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, priests from the Russicum and the Ruthenian College in the Vatican, as well as volunteers from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia, set off for the East. They traveled as military chaplains; some claimed to be civilians enrolled in the German army; some got jobs as grooms, taking care of horses in the German Transport Command. Once they found themselves in an appropriate area for pastoral or missionary work, anywhere from the Baltic to the Black Sea, they then went solo.
Those who arrived in former Catholic areas (of either Latin or Eastern rite) could find themselves in instant and dangerous demand, attracting hundreds of the people who had been without the sacraments for years. Most were eventually caught and shot as deserters and spies, or were sent to concentration camps. Those overtaken by the Russians ended up in the gulags. To this day, there is no published tally of the missing, the imprisoned, and the executed.50 Heydrich’s understanding of the “Tisserant Plan” thus failed to appreciate the complexities of Pacelli’s policy toward the evangelization of the East. An essential feature of that policy was the distinction between Catholics of the Latin rite and Catholics of the Eastern rite, sometimes also known as the Byzantine or Oriental rite.
These Eastern-rite Catholics bore much in common with the “schismatic” Orthodox Christians, and in some areas, such as Ukraine, Eastern-rite Catholic priests had been allowed to marry according to the practice in the Orthodox Church. Cardinal Tisserant’s Congregation for the Eastern Churches was principally concerned with Catholics who followed these Eastern liturgies but who were in communion with the Pope. In some areas, the Latin and Eastern rites existed side-by-side, as in Ukraine and, notably, in the new Croatia. The “Tisserant Plan” involved the encouragement of the Catholic Eastern rite by supplying these areas with priests and catechetical and liturgical books. For Pacelli, however, the new situation of the Catholic Eastern rite in the Independent State of Croatia gave new impulse to the ambitious dream that had lured him and the Curia in 1913 into negotiating the Serbian Concordat: the prospect of evangelization under the auspices of both rites—Latin and Eastern, both loyal to the Pontiff—eastward through Romania, into Ukraine, and so into Russia, and southward into Greece. The potential for enticing mass conversions of the “schismatic” Orthodox, through their close proximity to the Catholic Eastern rite, explains Pacelli’s indulgent policy toward Pavelic and his murderous regime.
Had he combated Pavelic’s forced conversions, deportations, and massacres with denunciations and excommunications, the existence of the Croatian bridgehead to the East might have been put in peril. Patience, acquiescence, connivance, were the options evidently Pacelli chose. For Pacelli ecumenism had only one meaning: that the separated Christian brethren would see the error of their ways and return to full union with the Pope and Rome. In 1940 Archbishop Stepinac had told the Regent Prince Paul of Yugoslavia: “The most ideal thing would be for the Serbs to return to the faith of their fathers, that is, to bow the head before Christ’s representative, the Holy Father.
Then we could at last breathe in this part of Europe, for Byzantinism has played a frightful role in the history of this part of the world.”51 Expressing precisely this goal in his encyclical “Rome and the Eastern Churches” (Orientalis ecclesiae decus, April 23, 1944), Pacelli prayed for the removal of “the ageold obstacles” between the Eastern and the Roman Churches, as the “day dawns at last when there shall be one flock in one fold, all obedient with one mind to Jesus Christ and to his Vicar on earth.” That unity, he argued, was all the more pressing so that “Christ’s faithful ones should labor together in the one Church of Jesus Christ, so that they may present a common, serried, united, and unyielding front to the daily growing attacks of the enemies of religion.”52
Pacelli’s ambition for evangelization eastward, however, does not explain his silence on the extermination of the Jewish population of Croatia, a silence parallel with his failure to speak out on behalf of the Jews of the rest of Europe. But before turning to Pacelli’s record in relation to the Holocaust, a final reflection is necessary on the links between the fate of the wartime Ustashe treasury and the actions of the Vatican, which have reverberations to this day.
strana 260-266

http://crusadefortruth.com/links/PDFS/Hitler's_Pope%20.pdf